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premises, are nevertheless often admitted as 'evidence' of rental
value, and thereby of market value. Unless there is very clear
proof that the reserved rents are not representative of current
rental value, the condemnor may have difficulty in getting them
excluded from the evidence. Once they are admitted, we may sur-
mise that they exercise an influence on the jury's award in gross.50
Arguably, the courts' allowance of extrinsic evidence is their
recognition of and adjustment for the above illustrated inequity.
Furthermore, the use of the condemnation clause could
be considered a "market place" adjustment for the apparent in-
equity. Both the tax laws' inconsistency and the above award dis-
crepancies appear to be manifestations of the law's inability to
determine whether the landlord-tenant relationship is contrac-
tual, property, or both. In the meantime, hopefully, the standard
of "market or reasonable contract rent, whichever is higher"
will be sufficiently flexible to reflect economic fluctuations,
while considering both public cost and the viability of contrac-
tual expectations. At best, however, a new standard, unless ac-
companied by an essential redefinition of the tenurial relation-,
ship to reflect today's changing economic conditions, would merely
alleviate the symptoms without curing the illness.
JOHN J. ARK
POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS IN A CAR-NEW YORK'S
CRIMINAL PRESUMPTION STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
Growing public awareness and concern for the problem of
drug abuse has led to considerable state legislation designed to
curb the illegal use of dangerous drugs, including marijuana
and other nonnarcotics. Because drug use is a victimless crime,
and it is done in private, it is extremely difficult to arrest some-
one in the act of using drugs. Instead, mere possession of drugs
is made an offense. However, proof of actual possession is often
difficult when the defendant is not found to be in actual physi-
50. 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 123 (2d ed. 1953).
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cal control of the contraband. In attempting to deal with the
critical drug problem, New York, with the worst heroin prob-
lem in the United States, has enacted a unique statute that is
not found in any other jurisdiction. Where drugs are found in
a car, the conviction of any particular occupant is uncertain. To
circumvent this handicap for the prosecutor, the New York
Legislature enacted the following as section 220.25 of the Penal
Law:
The presence of a dangerous drug in an automobile, other than
a public omnibus, is presumptive evidence of knowing possession
thereof by each and every person in the automobile at the time
such drug was found . . . [S]uch presumption does not apply
... when the drug is concealed upon the person of one of the
occupants.'
The present paper will be a general discussion of this statu-
tory presumption, and is presented in four parts. Part I will show
how other jurisdictions deal with the problem of drugs found in
a car. Part II will analyze the actual effect of this presumption in
the New York courts. Part III will discuss legal presumptions and
evaluate the wisdom of section 220.25. Finally, part IV addresses
itself to the question of whether section 220.25 is valid under
recent Supreme Court decisions involving presumptions and the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitu-
tion.
I. RESULTS IN JURISDICTIONS WITHOUT THE PRESUMPTION
OF POSSESSION OF NARCOTICS IN
AUTOMOBILES
Every state in the United States has made it illegal to possess
dangerous drugs. Nearly all of these drug laws are based on
the Uniform Narcotics Control Act, and generally require, as
the elements of criminal possession, that the accused was "aware
of the presence and character of the particular substance, and
was intentionally and consciously in possession of it." 2 What,
however, is meant by the term "possession"? Possession is usually
1. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 220.25 (McKinney 1957) (emphasis added).
2. Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 810, 811 (1963). The Uniform Narcotics Drug Act does not
specifically mention knowledge or intent to possess. Id. at 821. See UNIFOR,%i NARCOTICS
DRUG ACr § 2.
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defined as actual physical custody and control. A typical descrip-
tion of a drug possession offense is that of California:
To establish unlawful possession [of narcotics], it must be shown
that the accused exercised dominion and control over the drug.3
The New York definition similarly requires knowing possession
and control.4 Why, then, the use of a presumption of possession
with respect to automobiles?
The purpose of such a statutory presumption is its great
aid to the prosecutor in gaining a conviction. Without the pre-
sumption it can be very difficult to prove actual physical control,
beyond a reasonable doubt, for drugs discovered in a car. Suppose
the police stop (presumably not unlawfully) a car with several
people in it and find narcotics in the automobile. If it is concealed
on one occupant, there is little problem. He and he alone is in
criminal possession (presumably the others will deny knowledge
of the drug). This would be true even in New York under sec-
tion 220.25. This, of course, is not always the case. What happens,
for example, when a drug is discovered in a car containing sev-
eral people and there is no direct evidence of it belonging
to any specific occupant? Can they all be found guilty for joint
possession, or can none of them be legally convicted? Let us exa-
mine some cases of this type in other jurisdictions without a pre-
sumption of possession.
In Orosco v. State,' a Texas court upheld a jury conviction
for possession where particles of marijuana were discovered on
the seat of an automobile on the side where the defendant had
been sitting, and an "experienced police officer" testified that the
defendant was under the influence of marijuana, based on the
latter's appearance. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
a marijuana' conviction of the two *appellants in Eason v.
United States," where drugs were found concealed in the back of
the dashboard of a convertible during a search at the California-Ti-
juana border. The court rejected the defendants' claims that they
were unaware of the drugs, that anyone could have hidden
them in a convertible, and that either one alone could have
3. People v. Hunt, 4 Cal. 3d 231, 236, 481 P.2d 205, 209, 93 Cal. Rptr. 197, 201(1971).
4. People v. Pippen, 16 App. Div. 2d 635, 227 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (lst Dep't 1962).
5. 164 Tex. Grim. 257, 298 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Grim. App. 1957).
6. 281 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1960).
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been guilty. The court held that the defendants' friendship and
joint venture was sufficient to allow an inference of knowing
possession. The same court, in Agobian v. United States,7 affirmed
a conviction for joint possession of heroin where the two defen-
dants were fleeing in a car from government officers and one
threw the drug out of the window. Although it was known which
defendant had actually thrown the narcotic, joint constructive
possession for both parties was upheld.
The above results were achieved without a statutory pre-
sumption of possession. However, there are also contrary re-
sults. In Crisman v. Commonwealth, the Virginia high court
reviewed the conviction of the two rear passengers in a car where
heroin was found on the rear floor. The court reversed, holding
that any one of the five occupants of the automobile, or even
a stranger, might have dropped the narcotic, and that since
there was no direct proof of ownership, conviction of the two
defendants was based on mere speculation. The court quoted an
earlier prohibition case:
The mere presence of a person in an automobile in which in-
toxicating liquor is being transported . . . which is not shown
to be owned by him or under his possession or control, single
or joint, is not a crime .... 
More recently, in State v. Faircloth,10 three men drove from
California to Nebraska. Police found marijuana in a duffel bag
near the front passenger and in a suitcase in the trunk. There was
no evidence as to the ownership of either the bag or the suitcase.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the evidence could al-
low a conviction of the front passenger, but not the other two,
as "mere presence at a place where a narcotic drug is found is
not sufficient."" In Montoya v. United States, 2 the defendant
was a passenger in his brother-in-law's truck, which was
found to contain over five hundred pounds of marijuana. Al-
though the driver pleaded guilty, Montoya denied knowledge of
the contraband. In this case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
7. 323 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 985 (1963).
8. 197 Va. 17, 87 S.E.2d 796 (1955).
9. Spratley v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 854, 860, 152 S.E. 362, 364 (1930).
10. 181 Neb. 333, 148 N.W.2d 187 (1962).
11. Id. at 337, 148 N.W.2d at 190.
12. 402 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1968).
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reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant was not shown
to have had knowledge or control of the marijuana (not readily
visible to a passenger). The court agreed that while possession
might be constructive only and still support a conviction,13
mere proximity is not in itself sufficient for constructive pos-
session.14
These last cases show why a prosecutor would want a stat-
ute similar to Penal Law section 220.25. In Crisman, one might
expect that the heroin found on the floor of the car ought to
allow at least one conviction among the five occupants. In
Montoya, the defendant may well have been innocent, since
he obviously need not have checked the contents of the truck dur-
ing the relatively short time that he rode in it. In Faircloth,
however, three men rode in the same car from California to
Nebraska. Under that circumstance it is some what surprising
that the court would mandate two men not guilty because the
illegal drug was found nearest the third, considering the addition-
al marijuana found in the car's trunk. This type of situation is
probably what section 220.25 was meant to cover by the New
York Legislature.
II. USE OF THE PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION OF
NARCOTICS IN NEw YORK
We have now examined several cases dealing with the pos-
session of drugs in an automobile in jurisdictions without a pre-
sumption of knowing possession, and have seen that the results
vary widely. We ought now to look at the few reported New York
cases and view how the presumption has actually been applied.
As a prefatory note, it should be mentioned that the New York
presumption was first promulgated in 1952 as section 1751 (4)
of the former Penal Law.15 The Penal Law was renumbered as
of 1967. There is, however, one major difference between the
13. See, e.g., Quiles v. United States, 344 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
992 (1965).
14. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 290 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1961).
15. [1952] N.Y. Sess. Law, ch. 414. This section provided, inter alla, "The presence
in an automobile, other than a public omnibus, of any narcotic drug, in an amount
equal to or in excess of that which is set forth in subdivision two of this section ... shall
be presumptive evidence of its possession and control, knowlingly . . . by each and
every person found in such automobile at the time such narcotic drug is found. . ....
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two penal statutes. While the present section 220.25 specifically
nullifies the presumption when the drug is concealed upon
the person of one occupant, former section 1751 (4) applied the
presumption in that situation to all occupants. The newer ver-
sion is certainly more rational, as one should hardly be held re-
sponsible for what another person has hidden on his person.
The Legislature is now apparently satisfied that in such a
situation, at least one person will be convicted since he will be
in actual physical custody and control.
The earliest reported opinion in this area is People v. Potter."8
There, two men were sitting in the front seat of a parked car and a
third, Wiggins, sat in the rear. When a police officer approached
the automobile, Wiggins took a package containing heroin out
of his pocket and threw it out the window. All three men were
arrested for possession of heroin. The two defendants in the
front seat moved that since they had no physical possession of
the drug, the presumption of section 1751 (4) did not apply. This
was an ill-advised contention, as that statute was specifically designed
to include persons in the defendants' position. Had they been
found with heroin in their physical possession, there would have
been no reason to apply the presumption to them. As would be
expected, the court denied the motion, holding that the pre-
sumption applied under the facts of the case. Interestingly, the
presumption apparently could not be used under those circum-
stances today. As we have seen, under section 220.25 there is no
presumption of possession where one occupant of the vehicle has
the drug concealed on his person, and here Wiggins had the drug
in his pocket.
In People v. Mitchell,17 two bags of heroin were thrown
out of a window of a moving automobile, and later retrieved by
the police. Here, the defendant contended that the statutory pre-
sumption is unconstitutional, in that it destroys the presump-
tion of innocence and compels the accused to come forward with
evidence to prove that he is not guilty. The court, in denying
defendant's motion to inspect the grand jury's minutes or to dis-
miss the indictment, rejected this argument, stating that such
16. 4 Misc. 2d 796, 162 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Bronx County Ct. 1956).
17. 51 Misc. 2d 82, 272 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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presumptions are not unconstitutional where they are neither
arbitrary nor conclusive.' 8 The court held:
As to the presumption here involved, there is . . . a rational
and pragmatic connection between the facts proved in the first
instance and the presumption, subject to rebuttal by any proof
or explanation .... "I
It was further held that the occupants of a car could not escape
the effects of the presumption by merely throwing a drug out of
the window when the police appeared. The court here extended
the area of the automobile to include its vicinity when the drug is
actually seen being thrown from the car. The use of the pre-
sumption in this case may be crucial to conviction. With it, all
of the occupants are in illegal possession of heroin. Without it,
none of the defendants can be tied to possession of the drug.
Conviction in the latter case would then turn on whether or
not the state could establish constructive joint possession. This
would obviously be more difficult than merely proving that a
drug was thrown out of a car window.
In People v. Rodolit, 20 police observed the defendant in
the company of "known narcotics addicts," arrested him in
his car, and found marijuana therein. It is of interest to note that
the other occupants of defendant's car at the time of his arrest,
despite being known addicts, were not arrested. The trial court
indicated there were sufficient grounds to arrest them under
the statutory presumption if the state had so desired. Had this
been done, they could likely not be convicted in any other juris-
diction. They were in another man's car, which contained con-
cealed marijuana, and undoubtedly would have denied all knowl-
edge of the drug. There is no prima facie case for possession. Using
the presumption, a conviction would not seem unreasonable.
As for the defendant, the presumption may be necessary for
conviction. He was found in his own car, which contained con-
cealed marijuana, and with known drug addicts present as
passengers. Can it be said beyond a reasonable doubt that he is
guilty, and that the drugs could not have been placed in the car
by the passengers?
18. See text at note 47, infra.
19. 51 Misc. 2d at 83-84, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
20. 47 Misc. 2d 129, 261 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1965).
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A recently reported case in this area is also probably the
most relevant. People v. Hargrove21 involved a sixteen year old
student with no previous record who, with a friend, went to ob-
tain his summer employment check. The two were offered a ride
by one Klingstein. While in the car, the latter offered appellant
a marijuana cigarette, but he declined. The police stopped the
car and found the marijuana. Based on the statutory presumption
of knowing possession, the defendant was adjudged a youthful
offender. On appeal, the appellate division unanimously reversed.
Despite the statutory presumption of defendant's guilt the court
held that:
[T]he totality of the circumstances herein do not permit the con-
clusion beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in
possession of the prohibited narcotic drug. He clearly was in the
vicinage on an innocent errand, the driver of the car was un-
known to him, he could not have known the contraband con-
tents of the car, and he spurned the offer of the cigarette....
[T]hese facts, in their totality, rebut the presumption . . . of the
statute.2 2
Thus, we see that the presumption may be rebutted by evidence
demonstrating that the defendant did not, in fact, have knowl-
edge of the presence of a drug in the automobile when he
entered it. According to the court, defendant was merely "an in-
nocent victim of circumstances." Here, without the presumption,
the court found no prima facie case against the defendant. Con-
sidering the fact situation, this seems the only reasonable decision.
In a recent related case,23 police found a hypodermic
needle in a car and arrested two men for criminal possession.
One of the men was standing outside the car at the time. While
denying a motion to suppress evidence, the court stated that it
might be difficult for the state to prove its case at trial. The court
pointedly commented that unlike the case of possession of nar-
cotics, "there is no similar statutory presumption as to crim-
21. 33 App. Div. 2d 539, 304 N.Y.S.2d 574 (lst Dep't 1969).
22. Id. at 540, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (emphasis added). Hargrove was specifically
cited and followed in People v. Anonymous, 65 Misc. 2d 288, 317 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Nassau
County Dist. Ct. 1970). There, defendant, an accused youthful offender, was driving
his mother's car in which were found four capsules of seconal (a barbiturate). Testi-
mony by the mother that she had a prescription for seconal, that she carried them in
a purse which occasionally spilled in the car, and that she was missing four capsules,
were held to rebut the presumption that defendant knowingly possessed seconal.
23. People v. Boyd, 57 Misc. 2d 769, 293 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Nassau County Dist. Ct.
1968).
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inal possession of a ,hypodermic instrument.' '24 This may be indica-
tive of judicial hostility towards this presumption.
Section 220.25 is not the only statutory presumption for pos-
session under the New York Penal Law. Another such statute is
section 265.15 (3)," which makes the presence in an automobile
(other than a stolen one) of a dangerous weapon presumptive evi-
dence of its possession by all persons occupying the car at the
time the weapon was found. This type of presumption was sus-
tained by a divided appellate division court in People v. Russo."6
The court noted:
It is not unreasonable to require, as the statute in effect
commands, that those who occupy an automobile in which a re-
volver or other dangerous weapon is found should explain their
knowledge of its presence in the automobile. An explanation by
an innocent occupant of such car, of course, overcomes the pre-
sumption. There is thus no danger that an innocent person may
become a victim of circumstances.27
In People v. Crawford,28 the Russo presumption was approved,
in part, by reference to People v. Terra,29 where in an opinion
by Judge (now Chief Judge) Fuld involving a presumption
that the presence of a machine gun in a room or vehicle is pre-
sumptive evidence of its unlawful possession by all persons oc-
cuping the place where it was found,80 it was said:
Presumptions are no innovation in the field of criminal law.
For many years legislatures have been enacting statutes providing
that certain facts, which in themselves would be insufficient to
justify a conviction, shall, when proved, constitute presumptive or
prima facie evidence of the existence of the principal fact in
issue. Although such provisions undoubtedly facilitate proof of
guilt and the task of the prosecution, they are not, for that reason,
to be condemned. However, the presumptive device provided for
may not be employed in such a manner as .to impair the right
to trial by jury, relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving
24. Id. at 772, 293 N.YS.2d at 757.
25. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15 (3) (McKinney 1967).
26. 278 App. Div. 98, 103 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Ist Dep't), aJ'd per curiam, 303 N.Y. 673,
102 N.E.2d 834 (1951).
27. Id. at 104-05, 103 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
28. 56 Misc. 2d 348, 350, 288 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827-28 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
29. 303 N.Y. 332, 334, 102 N.E.2d 576, 578, appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 938 (1951).
30. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1897, subd. 1-a (McKinncy 1944), as amended, § 265.15 (1)
(McKinney 1967).
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise deny to persons
accused of crime... [due process of law].3 '
In summing up the effect of Penal Law section 220.25, we
see, first of all, that the presumption of possession has had a
significant effect on the reported cases. However, this may be
merely the tip of the iceberg. The cases that are reported are
adversary proceedings, either hearings on a motion or actual
trials. The question is, how many drug arrests, and partcularly
arrests made after finding drugs in an automobile, actually get
to that stage?
Two of the most widespread drugs in illegal use in this coun-
try are heroin and marijuana. Yet, cases that come to actual
trial are few. A recent article3 2 describes a study on the dis-
position of 129 marijuana offenders in San Mateo County,
California. Of these, only four eventually went to trial in the sup-
erior court.3 3 A good proportion of the offenders pleaded guilty
to possession of marijuana, in return for the district attorney
dropping lesser charges.34 The vast majority of cases do not get
reported. The practical results for marijuana arrests in New
York are likely similar, except that for arrests involving a car, the
statutory presumption is even more likely to induce the defendant
to plead guilty. Heroin possessors in New York may be
turned over to the Narcotics Addiction Control Commission for
custodial arrangements and treatment in lieu of imprisonment.35
While the addict, at least those facing felony charges, will naturally
prefer the former course to the latter, without the presumption in
some instances he would be released for lack of evidence. Thus, the
statutory presumption of possession has definitely had a significant
effect on the enforcement of New York drug possession law.
III. LEGAL EFFECTS OF PRESUMPTIONS GENERALLY
In discussing the wisdom of statutory presumptions, we
myst first look into the question of what is a legal presumption
and what is its effect. Unfortunately, courts and legal writers have
31. 303 N.Y. at 334, 102 N.E.2d at 578.
32. Note, Possession of Marijuana in San Mateo County:- Some Social Costs of Crim-
inalization, 22 STAN. L. REv. 101 (1970).
33. Id. at 110.
34. Id.
35. N.Y. MENTAL HYGENE LAW § 208 (McKinney 1971).
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never agreed on this. As we have seen, a presumption is a pro-
cedural rule of law that establishes the existence of one fact from
proof of a second, where there is not enough direct evidence
to prove the first. Presumptions may be rebuttable and irrebut-
table. The classic example of the latter is that "everyone is pre-
sumed to know the law." The statutory presumptions we are
dealing with are all rebuttable. The problem to be considered is
how are they to be rebutted?
It is generally agreed that a criminal law presumption
shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence onto the
defendant. If he offers no proof on the particular subject, he will
"lose" on that element. Of course, the overall burden of proof of
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all the
evidence, must always remain with the prosecutor. What hap-
pens to the presumption, however, when the defendant intro-
duces evidence of his own on the subject? Professor Thayer's view
is that once any evidence tending to disprove the presumption
is introduced, even if disbelieved by both the judge and jury, the
presumption disappears.3 6 That is, the presumption merely fixes
the burden of producing evidence on the given issue. Once such
rebutting evidence is in fact introduced, the existence of the pre-
sumed fact must be proven just like any other fact. An alternative
view on rebutting presumptions is that of Professor Morgan, who
believes that in most cases the existence of the presumed fact must
be assumed until sufficient evidence is introduced by the opposing
party to allow the jury to find that the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed fact is more probable than its existence.3 7 Such a pre-
sumption involves the burden of persuasion.
The criminal law. has various situations in which it applies
Tebuttable presumptions in addition to the possession of drugs
and dangerous weapons. The most serious offense involving
presumptions in New York is kidnapping in the first degree. 8
There, a person who is kidnapped and not heard from again
by the time of the trial is presumed to have died during the abduc-
36. J. TirAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 836 (1898).
37. See Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REv.
,906, 931 (1931). For recent discussions of criminal law presumptions, see Note, The
Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REv. 341 (1970);
Note, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions 34 U. CIII. L. REV.
141 (1966).
58. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.25 (McKinney 1967).
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tion.3 Thus, there is no need for the state to prove the death of the
victim in such a prosecution. Another criminal law presumption is
found in the offense of possession of stolen property. One who
"knowingly possesses stolen property is presumed to possess it
with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an
owner thereof .... ,,4o A very useful presumption for the state is
the one regarding possession of gambling devices or records,4
wherein knowledge of the contraband character of the material is
imputed. In these last crimes, it is possession that must be proven,
while the criminal intent is presumed.
It can thus be seen that the use of statutory presumptions
can be a very powerful tool in the hands of the prosecutor. He
can use it to obtain a conviction where there is otherwise no
direct evidence of guilt. Obviously, there is a danger in this of
great injustice. In People v. Russo,42 the court said that one who
is found in an automobile in which there is a gun should explain
his presence there, and that a legitimate explanation would over-
come the presumption. The difficulty is that such explanation has
to be believed by the trier of fact. In People v. Hargrove,8 the
defendant was not believed by the trial court and he was con-
victed. Although the conviction was reversed on appeal, the
Hargrove fact situation could readily lead to a miscarriage of
justice under section 220.25. It is quite easy to imagine a per-
fectly innocent person being given a lift by one concealing drugs
in his car. Or, alternatively, one can imagine an innocent driver
who picks up a hitchhiker with a drug in his pocket. At the
approach of the police, the rider removes the drug and throws it
out of the window or on the floor. Perhaps the driver or passen-
ger can convince a court that he had never met the other party in
his life. This happened in Hargrove, but only at the appellate
level. What if he couldn't persuade the court? Might the answer
to this question depend on whether or not the innocent defendant
was a respectable member of the middle class or a college student
with long hair and a beard? What if a car is stopped and only
the driver is in it? On the floor in the rear or in the ash tray
39. Id. § 135.25 (3).
40. Id. § 165.55 (1).
41. Id. § 225.35 (1).
42. 278 App. Div. 98, 104-05, 103 N.Y.S.2d 603, 609 (1st Dep't 1951).
43. 33 App. Div. 2d 539, 304 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Ist Dep't 1969).
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are traces of marijuana. The driver swears that he knows nothing
about it. His wife and teenage children have access to the car, and
he drives a car pool to work every day. Without the presumption
of possession, the state is unable to prove control of the drug. With
it, the defandant may have considerable difficulty avoiding con-
viction. Consider again the problem of the hitchhiker. Har-
grove could show that he had never met the driver. Suppose,
however, we modify the facts and the driver and passenger are
friends or relatives? This was the fact situation in Montoya v.
.United States.4 4 There, the court of appeals reversed the de-
fendant's conviction because there was insufficient evidence to
show that he knew of the marijuana in his brother-in-law's
truck. Since the prosecution had to sustain the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction could not be
upheld. Assuming Montoya's innocence, what result if that case
were tried in New York under present law?
Thus, there is a very real possibility of great injustice in
these situations. Innocent people could well be convicted
on what is in effect the barest circumstantial evidence. Re-
cent decisions45 of the United States Supreme Court have cast
doubt on the constitutional validity of section 220.25 of the New
York Penal Law, and the entire question may ultimately be ren-
dered moot. Assuming that the statute is not invalid, however,
the fundamental problem remains that it goes too far. It would
be desirable for the Legislature to ameliorate the present pro-
visions. There are basically two ways in which this could be ac-
complished. The best modification would make the presence of
an illegal drug in an automobile no more than circumstantial
evidence of the knowing possession of all occupants. A jury should
not convict someone solely on the basis of his being in a car in
which a drug was found. The prosecution should have to bring
in additional evidence as well or fail to sustain its burden of
proof. As a secondary, less desirable remedy, the presumption
could be limited in scope. It might be made presumptive evidence
of possession for the driver or the owner if he is present in
the car when the drug is found. Such a presumption would not
apply to anyone else. This would be a fairer rule than the pre-
44. 402 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1968).
45. See text at notes 60-67, infra.
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sent one, for these individuals could more reasonably be forced
to explain the presence of a drug in the car than a mere pas-
senger. Nevertheless, the resultant statute would still leave a sub-
stantial possibility of injustice. The hypothetical driver of the car
pool mentioned above, for example, would be in no better posi-
tion to defend himself than he is under the present law. However,
the conflict with due process would at least be reduced.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
Because part of the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence is shifted from the prosecution to the defense, not all
presumptions in the field of criminal law are valid. Rather,
they must always be considered in light of the due process of
law requirements of the Constitution .4  As a result, the Su-
preme Court has often dealt with the subject of criminal statutory
presumptions.
In an early, often cited case, the Court said:
That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of
another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or...
of the equal protection of the law it is only essential that there
shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and
the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference . . . shall not
be so unreasonable as .to be a purely arbitrary mandate.4 7
One of the best known of all federal criminal presumptions dealt
with the statutes enacted by Congress wherein anyone in crim-
inal possession of narcotics was presumed to have knowledge of
its illegal importation. 48 Thus, possession of the proscribed drugs,
not in itself unlawful, was sufficient evidence in itself to allow a
jury to convict for illegal importation. In the 1925 landmark
case of Yee Hem v. United States, 49 the presumption was affirmed
by the Court for possession of opium. There, it was held that
forcing an accused to rebut a statutory presumption by a satis-
factory explanation is not violative of his fifth amendment rights
by compelling him to be a witness against himself. A few years
46. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
47. Mobile, J. & K. C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910) (emphasis added).
48. The Narcotics Drugs Import and Export Act, ch. 629, §§ 105 (opiates and
cocaine), 106 (marijuana), 70 Stat. 570 (repealed 1970).
49. 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
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later, in Casey v. United States,50 Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for
a divided Court, upheld such statutes in general by affirming a
conviction for the illegal importation of morphine. Holmes wrote:
[T]here are presumptions that are not evidence in a proper
sense but simply regulations of the burden of proof. . . . The
statute here talks of prima facie evidence but it means only that
the burden shall be upon the party found in possession to ex-
plain -and justify it when accused of the crime that the statute
creates.51
In Casey, it was also stated that,
It is consistent with all the constitutional protections of accused
men to throw on them the burden of proving facts peculiarly
within their knowledge and hidden from discovery by the Gov-
ernment.5
2
This latter rationale, however, was later rejected by the Court
in Tot v. United States.5 3
During the 1960's the presumption of knowing illegal impor-
tation of marijuana based on its mere possession was attacked on
the grounds that it was unreasonable, in view of the large a-
mounts of the drug being grown in the United States. In the now
famous Leary case,64  the Supreme Court agreed. The Court
there held the presumption unconstitutional on the grounds that
there was lacking a rational connection between the fact of pos-
session of marijuana and the presumed knowledge of its illegal
importation. Mr. Justice Harlan applied what has since become
known as the "more likely than not" test, writing,
The upshot . . . is . . . that a criminal statutory presumption
must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence uncon-
stitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial as-
surance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow
from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.55
Perhaps most significant in Leary is what the Court may have
left for the future. Since it found that the statutory presumption
50. 276 U.S. 413 (1928).
51. Id. at 418.
52. Id.
53. 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
54. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
55. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
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of illegal importation of marijuana was unconstitutional under
the standard it had just established, the Court raised by way of
dicta, but did not answer, the question of whether such a pre-
sumption must also satisfy the much tougher "criminal reasonable
doubt" standard of proof as wellY6
The latest word from the Supreme Court on this subject
is the recent case of Turner v. United StatesY There, the
Court upheld the statutory presumption of illegal importation
of heroin from its possession, under both the "more likely
than not" and "reasonable doubt" standards of Leary. However,
the presumption with respect to cocaine, which is legally man-
ufactured in the United States, was struck down. In Turner,
Mr. Justice White stated,
[A] statute authorizing the inference of one fact from the
proof of another in criminal cases must be subjected to scrutiny
by the courts to prevent 'conviction upon insufficient proof.'55
The dissent of Mr. Justice Black bitterly objected to the affir-
mation of the presumption as to heroin. After concluding that
presumptions in general violate due process of law, Black wrote:
These statutory presumptions are unconstitutional for yet an-
other reason . . . . [T]he Constitution requires that the defen-
dant in a criminal case be presumed innocent and it places the
burden of proving guilt squarely on the Government. Statu-
tory presumptions . . .rob the defendant of at least part of his
presumed innocence and cast upon ,him the burden of proving
that he is not guilty .... Presumptions . . . tend to coerce and
compel the defendant into taking the witness stand in his own be-
half, in clear violation of the accused's Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 59
The most relevant Supreme Court opinion on our subject
is undoubtedly that of Romano v. United States.60 Thhre, a con-
viction for possession of an illegal still had been based on a
56. Id. at 36 n.64. Such a standard would require, before a presumption could
come into effect, that "the inference is one sustained by substantially more than a pre-
ponderence of the evidence, that the probability [of the inference being correct] is
far in excess of 50-50 ..... United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776, 784 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
57. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
58. Id. at 404.
59. Id. at 432 (dissenting opinion). Present federal narcotics laws no longer in-
clude this presumption; see Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 844, 952, 960 (1970).
60. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
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federal presumption that presence at an illegal still "shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the
defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury."'"
The Court distinguished an analogous case-United States v.
Gainey,62 decided only a few months earlier-where it upheld
a similar presumption that presence at an illegal still is suf-
ficient to convict for carrying on the business of an illegal dis-
tillery. In Gainey, it was held that the connection between the
proven fact and the presumed fact was rational, since almost every-
one at the site of a secret still could be said to be at least aiding
and abetting the operation. In Romano, however, the Court found
the connection between presence and possession too tenuous to
uphold the statute's inference. Mr. Justice White, while agree-
ing that "[p]resence is relevant and admissible evidence in a
trial on a possession charge, ' 03 stated further that:
The United States has presented no cases in the courts which have
sustained a conviction for possession based solely on the evidence
of presence. All of the cases . . . have held presence alone, un-
illuminated by other facts, to be insufficient proof of possession.6 4
Thus, although Congress has declared that under the given cir-
cumstances presence is "sufficient evidence to prove the crime of
[illegal] possession beyond [a] reasonable doubt . . . [, the]
approach obviously fails under the standards traditionally applied
to such legislation."0 5
Where do these Supreme Court cases leave the New York
statutory presumption on possession of drugs in automobiles?
The Court has clearly demonstrated a certain hostility toward such
presumptions. In Turner, the Court specifically ruled that pos-
session of a narcotic would authorize, but not require, a jury to
convict a defendant for illegal importation of the drug. 6 In Leary,
the Court mentioned the possibility of imposing a strict
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for all presumptions in crim-
inal cases.0 7 This, of course, would virtually nullify such presump-
tions. In Romano, the Court flatly rejected as unconstitutional
61. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 5601 (b) (1).
62. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
63. 382 US. at 141 (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
66. 896 U.S. at 406 n.6.
67. 395 U.S. at 36 n.64.
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proof of mere presence at an illegal still as allowing a presump-
tion of possession and control of it, "with all due deference to
the judgment of Congress. 68
Romano would appear to indicate that the mere presence
of a defendant in a car in which a dangerous drug is found can-
not by itself be held as presumptive evidence of his knowing pos-
session of the drug. The words "presumptive evidence" should
be construed either to mean "circumstantial evidence,"' requir-
ing the prosecution to produce additional facts besides presence
in order to sustain its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
or, at most, to apply only to the owner or driver. Otherwise, the
statute must be considered to be in violation of the fourteenth
amendment's due process of law clause. In any event, these last
decisions of the Supreme Court must be interpreted as having
seriously weakened the validity of section 220.25 of the New
York Penal Law, and it is hoped that this statute will soon be
appropriately challenged.
WILLIAM M. FEIGENBAUM
THE UNEMPLOYED HOUSEWIFE-MOTHER: FAIR APPRAISAL OF
ECONOMIC LOSS IN A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION*
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years our courts and juries have placed what seems in
retrospect to be a small or minimum value on the damages sus-
tained to the next of kin on the death of a housewife and mother.
It is only in the last two decades that our courts have come to
recognize the true value of a housewife and the services she per-
forms.1
Once the courts recognized these services as an ingredient
to be used in determining injuries to the survivor of a decedent
housewife and mother, the amount of recovery for the loss of
68. 382 U.S. at 144.
*The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Aaron J. Broder, Esq., New
York, New York whose work provided the inspiration for the development of this
topic.
1. Horton v. State, 50 Misc. 2d 1017, 1024, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312, 320 (Ct. CL. 1966).
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